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Abstract
An important puzzle in corporate taxation is that effective tax rates have
fallen significantly while tax revenue has simultaneously risen in most countries.
Moreover, the gross profitability of firms seems to be lower in high-tax countries,
even though standard models of international investment would yield the oppo-
site conclusion. We offer an explanation for these stylized facts by setting up a
simple two-country model of tax competition with heterogenous firms. In this
model a unique, asymmetric Nash equilibrium can be shown to exist, provided
that countries are sufficiently different with respect to their exogenous market
conditions. In equilibrium the larger country levies the higher tax rate and at-
tracts the high-cost firms. A simultaneous expansion of both markets intensifies
tax competition and causes both countries to reduce their tax rates, despite
higher corporate tax bases.
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1 Introduction
The development of corporate taxes under conditions of increasing capital and firm
mobility has been a prominent field of study for some time.1 Nevertheless, several
important puzzles remain that have not been explained by the existing literature in a
satisfactory way. We argue in this paper that an important shortcoming of the existing
theory of corporate taxation and capital tax competition is that it typically assumes
all firms to be identical. By incorporating firm heterogeneity into a simple model of
corporate tax competition we arrive at conclusions that are consistent with some of
the main developments of corporate taxation in the industrialized countries over the
last decades.
A first empirical puzzle is that corporate income tax (CIT) rates have fallen signifi-
cantly, yet at the same time corporate tax revenue, as a fraction of GDP, has increased
in most countries. This is summarized in Table 1 for selected OECD countries. The
table shows that statutory corporate tax rates have been strongly reduced in virtually
all countries in the sample since the mid-1980s. This downward trend is still clearly
visible when using the ‘effective average tax rate’, which accounts for the simultane-
ous broadening of tax bases that has occurred in many countries.2 At the same time,
corporate tax revenue has risen in all of the smaller OECD countries in the sample,
whereas the picture for the larger countries is somewhat more mixed. In the (weighted)
OECD average, however, there is a clear increase in corporate tax collections.
Several arguments have been put forth to explain the co-existence of falling tax rates
and rising tax revenues. One is that a rising share of companies has chosen to incorpo-
rate, partly in order to benefit from lower corporate tax rates, as compared to personal
income taxes. Empirical studies indicate, however, that this argument can explain only
a fraction of the observed increase in corporate tax revenues.3 Secondly, several studies
have found empirical evidence that multinational firms have engaged in income shifting
1Wilson (1999) and Fuest et al. (2005) provide thorough surveys of the theoretical literature.
2See Devereux et al. (2002) for an elaboration of this concept, and for a more detailed overview of
the trends in capital income taxation since the 1980s. A recent summary of these trends is found in
Auerbach et al. (2008).
3de Mooij and Nicode`me (2007) estimate that increased incorporation has raised the corporate
tax-to-GDP ratio by some 0.25 percentage points since the early 1990s, other things being equal.
This increase is substantially lower than the average increase in CIT revenues shown in Table 1, even
though the latter incorporate the negative effect of falling tax rates.
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Table 1: Corporate taxation in selected OECD countries∗
statutory effective ave- CIT revenue
tax ratea rage tax rateb (% of GDP)
1985 2005 1985 2005 1985 2005
large countries (> 20 million)
Australia 50 30 37 26 2.6 6.0
Canada 45 36 28 28 2.7 3.5
France 50 34 34 25 1.9 2.4
Germany 63 38 45 32 2.2 1.7
Italy 46 37 31 26 3.1 2.8
Japan 56 40 45 32 5.7 4.2
Spain 35 35 27 26 1.4 3.9
United Kingdom 40 30 28 24 4.7 3.4
United States 50 39 32 29 1.9 3.0
∅ large countriesc 50.3 37.4 34.6 28.6 2.8 3.2
small countries (< 20 million)
Austria 61 25 37 22 1.4 2.2
Belgium 45 34 35 26 2.2 3.5
Finland 60 26 45 21 1.4 3.3
Greece 44 32 36 21 0.7 3.2
Ireland 10 13 5 11 1.1 3.4
Netherlands 43 32 34 25 3.0 3.8
Norway 51 28 36 24 7.3 11.8
Portugal 55 28 48 20 2.2e 2.8
Sweden 60 28 45 21 1.7 3.7
Switzerland 35 34 26 25 1.7 2.6
∅ small countriesc 46.8 29.2 35.2 22.5 2.3 3.9
∅ all countriesc 49.9 36.7 34.7 28.1 2.7 3.3
∅ total OECDd 2.6 3.9
∗ The table lists all countries for which effective average tax rates are available since 1985.
a including local taxes
b base case: real discount rate: 10%, inflation rate: 3.5%, depreciation rate: 12.25%, rate of
economic rent: 10% (financial return: 20%)
c weighted average in sample, countries weighted by GDP in 2005
d weighted average of all OECD countries; see OECD (2008)
e 1990
Sources: Devereux et al. (2002); www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication id=3210
OECD (2008), Table 12 http://dx.doi.org./10.1787/443744327555
OECD (2009). http://statlinks.oecdcode.org/302009011P1T010.XLS
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from high-tax to low-tax countries (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven,
2008). This can explain why small, low-tax countries have experienced a higher growth
of corporate tax revenues as compared to larger countries (see Table 1), but it cannot
explain an increase in average tax collections.4 It is therefore at least suggestive to
explain the divergent developments of corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues
in the past two decades by an increase in the overall profitability of the incorporated
sector during this period. This proposition is supported by the evidence obtained in
detailed country studies for the United Kingdom (Devereux et al., 2004) and Germany
(Becker and Fuest, forthcoming).5
Explaining the growth of CIT revenue (at least partly) by rising overall profits in
the corporate sector raises a further question, however. Standard optimal tax theory
would predict that, other things being equal, tax rates should rise when the tax base
is enlarged, because a marginal tax rate increase generates more additional revenue.
Hence, the trends summarized in Table 1 can only be explained when tax competition
has simultaneously intensified so that countries find it optimal to reduce tax rates,
despite larger corporate tax bases.
A final puzzle in corporate taxation arises from the empirical evidence showing that the
gross profitability of firms is higher, on average, in low-tax countries (e.g. Becker et al.,
2009). Standard models of international investment would suggest the opposite con-
clusion, as capital owners should be compensated for higher tax payments by a higher
gross return to capital in high-tax countries. One explanation for this apparent conflict
is that multinational firms shift income from high-tax to low-tax countries in order to
reduce their worldwide tax payments. Tax practitioners remind us, however, that in-
come shifting is limited by existing rules to trade at arm’s-length prices, which cannot
be costlessly circumvented.6 It is therefore not clear that profit shifting alone is able to
4The profit shifting argument alone can even be expected to lead to falling corporate tax revenues
in the OECD average, as profits are also shifted from (high-tax) OECD countries into tax havens.
5The aggregate increase in profitability may be closely related to sectoral shifts within the incor-
porated sector, in particular, the expansion of the (until recently) highly profitable financial sector. In
both the United States and the United Kingdom the share of corporate tax revenues collected from
this sector rose from around 10% in the early 1980s to more than 25% of total CIT revenue in 2003
(Auerbach et al., 2008, Figure 5).
6In the United States, one indicator for the limited possibilities of firms to minimize their tax
payments is the rising importance of corporate losses that are not deductible from tax. As Auerbach
(2006, p. 14) concludes, this development “casts some doubt on the importance of tax planning
strategies as a vehicle for reducing corporate taxes”.
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resolve the discrepancy between theoretical and empirical results. An alternative expla-
nation is that there is a real difference in the gross-of-tax profitability of investments in
high-tax and in low-tax countries. Several recent studies from the international trade
literature show that firms within an industry differ strongly by their productivity (see
Tybout, 2003 and Bernard et al., 2007 for surveys). Hence, if high-productivity firms
have a distinct incentive to locate in low-tax countries, then the observed relationship
between taxes and profitability can be explained even in the absence of profit shifting.
As a result, the empirical importance of profit shifting may have been overestimated,
due to the failure to account for productivity differences between individual firms.
Our argument in the present paper is that the expansion of profitable markets in
conjunction with heterogeneity between firms offers a possible explanation for these
stylized facts in a coherent theoretical framework. To develop this argument we set up
a simple model of tax competition where a fixed number of firms differs exogenously
in their costs of producing a homogeneous good. In this model firms sort according to
their cost structure and high-cost firms locate in the high-tax country, whereas low-
cost firms settle in the low-tax country. This is because (labor) costs of production
are deductible from the corporate tax base and the value of this deduction is higher
for high-cost firms, and it matters more in the high-tax country. A core simplification
in our benchmark model is that each firm produces only one unit of output, in the
country of its choice. We also show, however, that the basic properties of our simple
model carry over to an extended setting where firms’ output choices are endogenous.
One important analytical problem arising from firm heterogeneity is that governments’
best response functions are generally not continuous, as each country has an incentive
to marginally underbid its neighbor’s tax rate and attract the low-cost (and hence high-
profit) firms. The simplicity of our benchmark model allows us to prove the existence
of a unique Nash equilibrium in tax rates, provided that countries are sufficiently
different with respect to exogenous market conditions. In this equilibrium the larger
country levies a higher tax rate than its smaller neighbor, and it attracts the high-
cost firms. Based on this asymmetric Nash equilibrium we then consider changes in
market size that raise the overall profitability of firms. In particular, we show that
a simultaneous expansion of both markets will cause the pivotal firm to react more
sensitively to corporate taxation, rendering tax competition more aggressive. In the
new equilibrium this leads to falling tax rates in both countries, even though corporate
tax bases are simultaneously enlarged.
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Our model is directly related to the recent theoretical literature on trade and firm
heterogeneity, starting with Melitz’s (2003) well-known model of a monopolistically
competitive industry in which firms draw their productivity randomly. We incorporate
some of the basic findings of this line of research into the literature on taxation and
foreign direct investment. The latter has analyzed the interaction between taxes and
firm location in models of industry agglomeration (see Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Kind
et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and Pflu¨ger, 2006), or in models that
explicitly allow for heterogeneous countries, in particular with respect to market size
(e.g. Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Haufler and Wooton, forthcoming). However,
with few recent exceptions, the heterogeneity of firms has been neglected so far in the
international tax literature.
A first analysis of tax competition in the presence of heterogeneous firms is Burbidge
et al. (2006). In this paper each firm’s productivity also differs across regions, however.
This feature eliminates the sorting of firms on the basis of tax rates only, leading to a
smooth trade-off for tax policy that is very different from the one studied here. Closer
to our setting is Davies and Eckel (forthcoming). Their framework differs from ours
in that they use a model of monopolistic competition and allow for endogenous firm
entry. Accordingly the focus of their analysis is on the normative question of whether
tax competition distorts the equilibrium number of firms in the industry, whereas our
analysis aims to explain existing trends in corporate tax policy. Another difference
is that the model of Davies and Eckel is considerably more complex than ours. As
a result, the authors are not able to establish sufficient conditions for the existence
of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in tax rates. Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr
(2009) also present a model of tax competition with firm heterogeneity, but they focus
on the competition for book profits between a large country and a tax haven, rather
than on the location decision of mobile firms. Finally, some recent studies address
tax policy issues in settings that involve the sorting of heterogeneous firms in the
presence of international tax differentials (Becker and Fuest, 2007; Baldwin and Okubo,
forthcoming). These studies are not cast in a tax competition framework, however.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our basic tax competition
model. Section 3 asks under which conditions a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
exists in this model. Section 4 analyzes the effects of a unilateral and a general increase
in market size on tax rates and tax revenue in each country. Section 5 extends the basic
model to allow for variable outputs of firms. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 Firms
We consider a region of two countries i ∈ {1, 2} in which two goods are produced. Our
focus lies on the market for a homogeneous good x, which is served by a total ofN firms.
Entry to the x-industry is restricted because one unit of a specific factor (‘capital’) is
needed to produce at all, and the supply of this factor is fixed at N .7 Importantly,
the N firms differ in their costs of production. Specifically we assume that costs are
drawn randomly and independently from a uniform distribution with c ∈ [c, c]. These
costs reflect the firm-specific employment of labor that is needed to produce one unit
of output, irrespective of where the output is produced. Each firm, identified by its
unit cost c, decides in which country to settle and produce output. Locations differ
with respect to their market potential, in a way described in more detail below. Firms
decide on their location, knowing both countries’ markets and their own costs, and
forming rational expectations about the location of their rivals. Due to restricted entry
to sector x, all firms in this sector will make positive profits in equilibrium.8
The model is closed by the presence of a second, numeraire sector which produces
output under perfectly competitive conditions using labor only. In each country one
unit of labor is required per unit of the numeraire good; hence free trade in this good
equalizes wages across countries at unity. As no profits are generated in the numeraire
sector, it remains in the background throughout our analysis. Aggregate labor supplies
in each country are exogenously given and labor is immobile across countries.
The aim of our analysis is to establish conditions under which a Nash equilibrium
in taxes exists in a model of heterogeneous firms, and to determine the effects that
market enlargement has on tax rates and tax revenues in each country. These effects
are derived in a two-stage game where governments first determine their tax policy and
firms then decide on their location. To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we focus
7As we will see below it is immaterial for the present analysis how this factor endowment is
distributed between residents of countries 1 and 2. The factor owners could also be located in a third
country (the rest of the world).
8Alternatively, the model could also endogenize the number of firms such that each firm makes a
start-up investment after which it learns its cost. Ex ante, firms would make expected zero profits,
and not all firms would be profitable. Our results do not change if countries set taxes after potential
entrants have made the investment, but before profitable firms decide on their location.
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only on the location decision of firms in our benchmark model. Hence we assume that,
irrespective of its costs, each firm produces exactly one unit of output in equilibrium.
Even though output choices are fixed, it is still true in our benchmark model that the
lowest-cost firms are the most valuable from the perspective of host countries, in the
sense that attracting them yields the largest gain in tax base. Hence the model retains
the essential qualitative characteristics of firm heterogeneity for tax policy decisions. In
Section 5 we analyze an extended version of our benchmark model where firms’ output
choices are endogenized and show that the basic properties of our benchmark model
carry over to this more general setting.
We parameterize the attractiveness of a location by Ai and assume, with no loss of
generality, that country 1 is the more attractive region so that A1 ≥ A2. The simplest
possible interpretation of this model is that each firm chooses the country where to
locate and then produces only for the local market. In this case Ai acts as an indicator
of market size. We assume that the (inverse) demand function for good x is linear in
each country and given by pi = Ai − ni, where pi is the price of good x and ni is
the number of firms, and hence total production, in country i. The gross profits of a
firm with costs c locating in country i are then Ai − ni − c. Alternatively, the model
is also able to accommodate an integrated market in which firms make an export
platform investment in one of the two countries and sell to the other market from this
location (cf. Ekholm et al., 2007). In that case, output can be freely sold in the common
market, but (exogenous) business conditions differ in the two countries and are more
favorable in country 1. Assuming that costs are composed of unit production costs and
agglomeration costs that are linearly increasing in the number of local firms, this setup
is formally identical to the case of local markets. In the following we mostly adopt the
interpretation of differences in local market size and refer to country 1 and country 2
as the ‘large’ and the ‘small’ country, respectively. In several places of our analysis we
emphasize, however, the equivalent interpretation of the model based on an integrated
economy with platform investment.
Each country levies a proportional profit tax at rate ti on the gross profits earned
by the firms in the x-industry that locate within its jurisdiction. All (labor) costs of
production are deductible from the profit tax base. Let pii(c) ≡ (Ai − ni − c)(1 − ti)
denote the net-of-tax profit of a firm with cost c in country i. Firms locate in the
country in which the expected net-of tax profit is larger. We denote by cˆ the costs of
the firm that is just indifferent between locating in country 1 and in country 2. If firms
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do not all locate in the same country (that is, if c < cˆ < c) the following arbitrage
condition must hold for this firm:
(A1 − n1 − cˆ)(1− t1) = (A2 − n2 − cˆ)(1− t2), n1 + n2 = N. (1)
Through the arbitrage condition (1) the pivotal firm with costs cˆ is just compensated
for the higher tax in, say, country 1, either by a larger market in country 1 or by a
smaller number of competitors.
To see how changes in production costs affect firms’ location choice, we differentiate
pii(c) with respect to c and obtain
∂pii
∂c
= −(1− ti) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. (2)
Hence a given increase in costs will lead to a smaller reduction in net profits in the
high-tax country. The reason is that (labor) costs are deductible from the corporate
tax base and this deduction is more valuable, the higher is the tax rate. Together with
the arbitrage condition of the pivotal firm [eq. (1)], this implies that all firms with costs
c > cˆ will locate in the high-tax country, whereas all firms with costs c < cˆ will prefer
to locate in the low-tax region.
With the high-tax country attracting the high-cost firms, and given our assumption that
costs are uniformly distributed in the interval [c, c], the critical cost level cˆ determines
the (expected) number of firms that locate in each country by
ni =
c− cˆ
c− c N, nj =
cˆ− c
c− c N, i 6= j, ti > tj. (3)
From (3) and the arbitrage condition (1), we can derive the critical cost level cˆ as a
function of the exogenous parameters and the endogenous tax rates ti. This depends on
which country chooses the lower tax rate and thus attracts the low-cost firms. Denoting
by a subscript I (II) the regime where t1 > t2 (t1 < t2) and assuming interior solutions
we get
cˆI =
(A2 + cφ)(1− t2)− (A1 −N − cφ)(1− t1)
ΘI
if t1 > t2, (4a)
cˆII =
(A1 + cφ)(1− t1)− (A2 −N − cφ)(1− t2)
ΘII
if t1 < t2, (4b)
where
ΘI ≡ (φ+ 1)(1− t2) + (φ− 1)(1− t1) > 0, (5a)
ΘII ≡ (φ+ 1)(1− t1) + (φ− 1)(1− t2) > 0, (5b)
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and
φ ≡ N
(c− c) ≥ 1. (6)
In expression (6) we thus assume that there is a minimum density of firms, relative to
the cost spread between the firms with the highest and those with the lowest costs of
production. This condition is sufficient to ensure that ΘI and ΘII are always positive.
Our further analysis is based on the following definition.
Definition: Let cˆ be the critical value of costs for the firm that is indifferent between
locating in country 1 or country 2. In Regime I, country 1 chooses the higher tax rate
(t1 > t2) and cˆ is given by (4a). In Regime II, country 2 chooses the higher tax rate
(t2 > t1) and cˆ is given by (4b).
Equations (3) and (4a)–(4b) determine the number of firms that locate in each country,
as a function of both tax rates. Differentiating these equations with respect to t1 and
t2 we can unambiguously sign
∂cˆI
∂t1
=
(1− t2) [(A1 −N − cφ)(φ+ 1) + (A2 + cφ)(φ− 1)]
Θ2I
> 0,
∂cˆI
∂t2
= −(1− t1)
(1− t2)
∂cˆI
∂t1
< 0;
(7a)
∂cˆII
∂t1
=
−(1− t2) [(A1 + cφ)(φ− 1) + (A2 −N − cφ)(φ+ 1)]
Θ2II
< 0,
∂cˆII
∂t2
= −(1− t1)
(1− t2)
∂cˆII
∂t1
> 0.
(7b)
In Regime I, where country 1 is the high-tax region, a rise in this country’s tax rate
will raise cˆI . Since country 2 hosts all firms with cost levels between c and cˆ in this
regime, this implies a rising number of firms in country 2 and accordingly a fall in n1.
An increase in t2 will instead reduce cˆI and thus increase the number of firms in the
high-tax country 1. In Regime II the signs of both derivatives are reversed.
2.2 Governments
Our analysis is based on the assumption that countries set taxes non-cooperatively
before firms decide on their location.9 Moreover, we assume that the objective of each
9For evidence that OECD countries compete over corporate taxes, see Devereux et al. (2008).
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government is to maximize (expected) profit tax revenue Ti in the x-industry. This
assumption implies that governments value tax revenue highly in comparison to con-
sumer and producer surplus. One common explanation is that governments are of a
Leviathan type and are therefore mostly interested in tax revenue. Alternatively, gov-
ernments could be politically forced by the working population to maximize revenue
from the corporate income tax, for example because capital is perceived to be gain-
ing from globalization, whereas labor is losing. Whatever its underpinnings, revenue
maximization is a frequent assumption in the tax competition literature. Revenue max-
imization is a particularly plausible assumption when the firms in the x-industry are
owned by foreigners so that the host country can increase domestic tax revenue at the
expense of the profit income of foreign shareholders.10
In Regime I the expected tax revenues of the two countries are given by
T I1 = t1
∫ c
cˆ
[A1 − φ(c− cˆI)− c]φdc, T I2 = t2
∫ cˆ
c
[A2 − φ(cˆI − c)− c]φdc, (8)
where the relevant expression for cˆ is given in (4a) and φ is in (6). Differentiating
country 1’s objective function with respect to t1, using the Leibniz integration rule and
canceling φ yields the following regime-specific first-order condition:
∂T I1
∂t1
=
∫ c
cˆ
[A1 − φ(c− cˆI)− c] dc− t1∂cˆI
∂t1
[A1 − 2φ(c− cˆI)− cˆI ] = 0.
Integrating the first term further gives
∂T I1
∂t1
= (c− cˆI)
[
A1 − φ(c− cˆI)− (c+ cˆI)
2
]
− t1∂cˆI
∂t1
[A1 − 2φ(c− cˆI)− cˆI ] = 0. (9a)
Similarly, the first-order condition for country 2’s government reads
∂T I2
∂t2
= (cˆI − c)
[
A2 − φ(cˆI − c)− (cˆI + c)
2
]
+ t2
∂cˆI
∂t2
[A2 − 2φ(cˆI − c)− cˆI ] = 0. (9b)
The interpretation of these first-order conditions is straightforward. The first term
in (9a) and (9b) gives the increase in revenues induced by a higher tax rate at an
unchanged tax base. This effect is unambiguously positive. The second terms give the
change in the tax base resulting from a small tax increase. Note first from (7a) that in
both (9a) and (9b) the second terms have the opposite sign as the squared brackets in
10In fact, in the interpretation of our model as one with export platform investment and costless
trade, revenue maximization is equal to welfare maximization when profits accrue to foreigners, because
consumer surplus in each country is fixed by the exogenous number of firms N .
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these terms. The squared brackets in turn combine two distinct effects. A tax increase
induces some firms to relocate to the other country, but the profits of the remaining
firms rise due to lower market output and accordingly higher prices. For an interior
equilibrium to exist, the first of these effects must dominate the second so that the
tax base falls in the country that marginally raises its tax rate. A sufficient condition
ensuring this is:
Ai − 2N − c > 0 ∀ i. (10)
Throughout the following analysis we assume that this condition is met. In verbal terms
it states that if all but one firms locate in the same country, attracting the last firm
(with the highest cost level c) will still raise aggregate profits in that country.
In Regime II the first-order conditions for the two countries’ optimal tax rates are
derived and interpreted analogously. These conditions are given in the appendix.
3 Existence of equilibrium
In this section we ask under which conditions a Nash equilibrium in taxes exists in the
present model. A fundamental existence problem arises in the presence of heterogeneous
firms because country i’s payoff is not continuous at the other country’s tax rate tj.
If country i overbids country j’s tax rate, then it will attract the high-cost (and thus
low-profit) firms. If instead country i underbids tj, then it attracts the low-cost (high-
profit) firms. Hence, each country’s tax revenue experiences an upward jump when the
tax rate is set marginally lower than in the competing jurisdiction. Accordingly, best
response functions can also be discontinuous in our model. These properties require a
thorough analysis of equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
As a starting point for our analysis, a natural benchmark is the case where market
conditions in the two countries are identical (i.e., A1 = A2). In this case it is also
natural to focus on a symmetric situation with t1 = t2 and ask whether this situation
can represent a Nash equilibrium. With identical market conditions and taxes, all firms
are indifferent as to their location and each firm will thus locate in each jurisdiction
with probability q = 0.5. In a situation where both countries choose the same tax rate
the expected per-firm tax revenue for each country is thus
Ti|t1=t2 = tq
∫ c
c
(Ai −Nq − c) 1
c− c dc =
t
2
[
Ai − N
2
− (c+ c)
2
]
∀ i. (11a)
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In contrast, if country i slightly underbids country j, it will still get half of all firms,
but now the low-cost firms will self-select into country i. Hence country i’s per firm
tax revenue becomes
Ti|ti=tj−ε = t
∫ (c+c)/2
c
(
Ai − N
2
− c
)
1
c− c dc =
t
2
[
Ai − N
2
− (c+ c)
2
+
(c− c)
4
]
∀ i.
(11b)
Comparing (11a) and (11b) shows that profits and tax revenue are unambiguously
larger for a country that marginally underbids its neighbor, because sales are the same,
but aggregate costs are lower in the low-tax country. Hence for any positive, common
tax rate t1 = t2 there is an incentive for each country to marginally underbid the other,
in order to attract the more profitable firms. Thus t1 = t2 > 0, with strict inequality,
cannot be a Nash equilibrium pair of taxes. A situation with t1 = t2 = 0 and hence
T1 = T2 = 0 can also not be an equilibrium, because each country can gain by setting
a positive tax rate and still attract some firms, obtaining strictly positive tax revenue.
Hence there cannot be a symmetric, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with t1 = t2.
This result implies that, unlike in tax competition models with homogeneous firms, a
situation of perfect symmetry is not a suitable starting point when firms differ in their
productivity levels.11 In the following we will therefore focus on asymmetric situations
and consider in turn the cases where the larger country 1 either has the lower or the
higher tax rate than its smaller neighbor.
We first ask whether an equilibrium can exist in Regime II. This yields:
Proposition 1 There cannot be an interior tax competition equilibrium in Regime II,
where the larger country (country 1) has the lower tax rate.
Proof: See the appendix.
The technical proof for the proposition is relegated to the appendix. The intuition for
Proposition 1 is, however, straightforward. In its tax optimum, each country equates
the marginal revenue gains and the marginal revenue losses resulting from a small tax
increase [see the discussion of (9a)–(9b)]. If a Regime II equilibrium with t1 < t2 existed,
the larger country 1 would clearly have the larger tax base as it would host more firms
11It is seen from (11a) and (11b) that there is no revenue gain from marginally underbidding the
neighboring country when c = c and thus the production costs of all firms are identical. This is the
reason why symmetric tax equilibria generally exist in models with homogenous firms (e.g. Ottaviano
and van Ypersele, 2005; Haufler and Wooton, forthcoming).
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and these firms would also be more profitable. Hence the marginal gains from a tax
increase would be unambiguously larger for country 1 than for country 2. Moreover, if
an interior tax equilibrium existed in Regime II, a marginal tax increase of country 1
would cause those firms to leave the country which have the highest costs among the
firms that locate in country 1 and hence are least attractive from the perspective of
this country. In contrast, a tax increase by country 2 would create an outflow of the
firms which have the lowest costs and hence are most valuable from the perspective of
country 2. Hence the marginal costs of a small tax increase would be lower for country 1
as compared to country 2. As country 1 would face higher benefits but lower costs from
a tax increase, as compared to country 2, it is impossible in such a situation that the
marginal gains and the marginal losses from a small tax increase can be equal in both
countries simultaneously.12
From Proposition 1 we know that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, if it exists at
all, can only arise in Regime I, with the larger country having the higher tax rate. It
can be shown that a Regime I equilibrium will indeed exist when A1 ≥ A2 + N and
hence the size or productivity advantage of country 1 is sufficiently large. From (4a)
this implies that country 1 would attract all firms, if tax rates were equal in the two
countries (i.e., cˆI = c). To establish this result we need to focus on situations in which
the own effects of tax rates on marginal tax revenues dominate the cross effects. This
is formalized by assuming that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix
|J | = ∂
2T I1
∂t21
∂2T I2
∂t22
− ∂
2T I1
∂t1∂t2
∂2T I2
∂t1∂t2
> 0
is strictly positive. Given this assumption, we are able to prove both existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in Regime I
with t1 > t2 ≥ 0 if country 1 is sufficiently large relative to country 2, i.e., A1 ≥ A2+N ,
and if |J | > 0.
Proof: See the appendix.
To provide an intuition for this proof, we start from a situation where country 2’s tax
rate is zero and country 1’s tax rate is at the highest possible level, denoted t¯1, that
12Note that this argument does not rely on the specific setup of our benchmark model. Hence it
carries over to the case where firms’ output choices are endogenous (Section 5).
13
is consistent with attracting all firms to this country. If, at t¯1, country 1’s marginal
tax revenues are negative [see eq. (9a)], then t¯1 > t2 = 0 must be a Nash equilibrium
because a deviation from t¯1 in either direction leads to tax revenue losses for country 1,
whereas country 2 cannot improve upon the outcome of zero tax revenue.13 If, in
contrast, country 1’s marginal tax revenues are positive at t¯1, then it will want to raise
its tax rate above t¯1. Once t1 has been increased such that cˆI > c, country 2 is also able
to attract some firms. Hence it has an incentive to raise its own tax rate above zero
while still underbidding country 1’s tax rate, in order to maintain a positive tax base.
In this case a mutually optimal set of tax rates with t∗1 > t
∗
2 will exist, which leads to
an interior equilibrium with a positive number of firms in each country.14
Proposition 2 is our first central result, establishing sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of a unique Nash equilibrium in our simple tax competition model with heteroge-
neous firms. In this equilibrium the larger country is able to levy the higher tax rate.15
Proposition 3 in Davies and Eckel (forthcoming) has a similar flavor, but the authors
are not able to place explicit conditions on the exogenous variables of their model
that ensure the existence of a tax competition equilibrium. Clearly, this is the result
of the simpler structure of our model. Given our assumptions, the sufficient condition
A1 ≥ A2 + N has a straightforward interpretation. It implies that the home market
advantage must be sufficiently large so that, in the absence of taxes, all firms would
want to settle in the larger country 1. In the location equilibrium with taxes, each firm
then trades off the net location advantage of country 1 (taking into account the larger
number of competitors in this country) against the tax advantage of country 2.
Note, finally, that Proposition 2 is not exhaustive in the sense that an equilibrium may
also exist if A1 ∈ [A2, A2+N ], that is, country 1 is larger than country 2 but it will not
host all firms when tax rates are equal. The difficulty that arises in this case is that
country 2 can secure a positive tax base with a strictly positive tax rate. This makes
it potentially interesting for country 1 to underbid country 2’s tax rate, in order to
attract all firms. Hence, if A1 − A2 < N , any candidate equilibrium must be immune
against such an underbidding strategy by country 1. We know that underbidding is
13Strictly speaking, country 2 is indifferent between all tax rates t2 ≥ 0, as its tax base is zero.
14If A1 = A2 +N then only an interior equilibrium can arise, because country 1 could only attract
all firms by setting a tax rate of zero, which would yield zero revenue.
15The result that the large country levies the higher tax rate is familiar from the literature on capital
tax competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). The novel element in a model with heterogeneous
firms is that the large country, by imposing the higher tax, also attracts the low-profitability firms.
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always profitable when countries are identical (A1 = A2). However, the more asym-
metric countries become, the lower is the taxing power of country 2 and thus the lower
is both the tax rate and the tax base of country 2 in an asymmetric candidate equi-
librium. Hence country 1 can only secure a small additional tax base by underbidding
country 2, and doing so requires a large drop in country 1’s tax rate. This implies that
the incentive for country 1 to underbid its smaller neighbor will monotonically fall as
the size asymmetry grows. From this discussion we expect that there is a critical size
difference (A1−A2)c < N such that an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium with the
properties of Proposition 2 exists, once this critical threshold is surpassed.16
4 Market expansion and tax competition
As we have discussed in the introduction, there are several empirical indications that
the expansion of highly profitable services, in particular in the banking and finance
sector, has contributed to rising corporate profits in many OECD countries during the
last decades. In the following we capture this development by an exogenous increase
in the size of either one or both markets in our model, as given by the parameters Ai.
This exogenous market expansion raises the profitability of all firms in equilibrium.
Our analysis is based on a situation where country 1 is sufficiently large, relative to
country 2, so that Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, in what follows we focus on an interior tax equilibrium where t∗1 > t
∗
2 >
0 and cˆI > c. We then consider small changes in the exogenous model parameters.
By a continuity argument, we assume that an equilibrium still exists after the small
perturbation of the initial equilibrium has taken place.
Our comparative static analysis starts from the optimal tax conditions in Regime I, as
given in (9a)–(9b). Perturbing this equation system yields the following responses of
optimal tax rates to an exogenous parameter change dξ:17
dti
dξ
=
1
|J |
[
−∂
2Tj
∂t2j
∂2Ti
∂ti∂ξ
+
∂2Ti
∂ti∂tj
∂2Tj
∂tj∂ξ
]
. (12)
Our first concern is the slope of best response functions. This is ambiguous for coun-
16These expectations are confirmed by simulations that we have carried out to identify (A1 −A2)c
numerically. See also Table 2 in Section 5.
17From here on, we suppress the regime index, as all expressions refer to Regime I.
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try 1:
∂2T1
∂t1∂t2
=
(
− ∂cˆ
∂t2
− t1 ∂
2cˆ
∂t1∂t2
)
[A1 − 2φ(c− cˆ)− cˆ]− t1 ∂cˆ
∂t1
∂cˆ
∂t2
(2φ− 1) ≷ 0. (13a)
The ambiguity arises from the effects collected in the round bracket in the first term
of (13a). The first term in this bracket is positive as ∂cˆ/∂t2 < 0 from (7a). Intuitively,
an increase in t2 increases the number of firms in the large country 1 by lowering cˆ and
this makes it more attractive for country 1 to raise its own tax rate. The second term
in the round bracket is negative, however, as
∂2cˆ
∂t1∂t2
=
1
Θ3
{[2− t1 − t2 + φ(t1 − t2)][(A1 −N − cφ)(φ+ 1) + (A2 + cφ)(φ− 1)]} > 0.
This term captures the fact that a rise in t2 lowers cˆ and thus increases the profitability
of the marginal firm in country 1. This causes country 1’s marginal firm to respond
more elastically to changes in t1 and tends to decrease country 1’s tax rate, other things
being equal. The second term in (13a) is positive from (7a) and (6). Overall, country 1’s
best response function can thus be upward or downward sloping.
In contrast, country 2’s best response is always upward sloping. This is seen from
∂2T2
∂t2∂t1
=
(
∂cˆ
∂t1
+ t2
∂2cˆ
∂t1∂t2
)
[A2 − 2φ(cˆ− c)− cˆ]− t2 ∂cˆ
∂t1
∂cˆ
∂t2
(2φ+ 1) > 0, (13b)
where (7a) is used to sign the effects on the marginal firm and ∂2cˆ/(∂t1∂t2) > 0. An
increase in t1 raises the tax base of country 2 and thus raises the benefits for country 2
to also increase its tax rate. At the same time an increase in t1 raises cˆ and lowers the
profitability of the marginal firm in country 2. This reduces country 2’s marginal costs
of taxation, as it causes its marginal firm to react less sensitively to an increase in t2.
The difference in the slopes of the best responses are caused by the opposite effects that
changes in t1 and t2 have on the profitability of the pivotal firm. The changing identity
of this firm affects in turn the sensitivity with which it responds to a tax increase in
the neighboring region. This (additional) interdependence between the tax policies in
the two countries is thus caused only by the presence of firm heterogeneity.
4.1 Isolated market expansion in country 2
We first consider a unilateral increase in the market size of country 2, so that dξ = dA2.
Hence we analyze a ‘catching-up’ process of the region which has the smaller market
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in our analysis.18 We analyze how this change affects tax rates in both countries and
consider country 1’s tax response first. The impact effect of an increase in country 2’s
market potential on the tax rate in country 1 is
∂2T1
∂t1∂A2
= − [A1 − 2φ(c− cˆ)− cˆ]
[
∂cˆ
∂A2
+
∂2cˆ
∂t1∂A2
]
− t1 ∂cˆ
∂t1
∂cˆ
∂A2
(2φ− 1) < 0, (14)
where
∂cˆ
∂A2
=
(1− t2)
Θ
> 0, (15)
from (4a) and ∂cˆ2/∂t1∂A2 > 0 from (7a) have been used to sign the effects. Hence
country 1’s tax rate unambiguously falls, upon impact, when A2 is increased. On the
one hand the larger market size of country 2 leads some firms to relocate to this country.
This reduces country 1’s tax base and hence the marginal benefit of a tax increase [the
first part of the first term in (14)]. On the other hand, the expansion of country 2’s
market increases the profits of the pivotal firm, making this firm more sensitive to tax
changes. This increases the marginal costs of a tax increase in country 1 [the second
part of the first term in (14)]. Finally, the second term in (14) is also negative, as the
marginal firm in country 1 is more profitable after the parameter change, and hence
country 1 loses a larger tax base when losing the marginal firm.
The impact change in the tax rate of country 2 is given by
∂2T2
∂t2∂A2
=
(cˆ− c)
2
[
2− (2φ+ 1) ∂cˆ
∂A2
]
+
∂cˆ
∂A2
[
A2 − φ(cˆ− c)− cˆ+ c
2
]
+ t2
∂cˆ
∂t2
[
1− (2φ+ 1) ∂cˆ
∂A2
]
+ t2
∂2cˆ
∂t2∂A2
[A2 − 2φ(cˆ− c)− cˆ] , (16)
where ∂cˆ/∂A2 is given in (15) and ∂cˆ/(∂t2∂A2) = −(1− t1)(φ− 1)/Θ2 ≤ 0 from (7a).
The first two terms in (16) give the increase in country 2’s tax base, induced directly
by A2 and also indirectly by the increase in cˆ following the change in A2. These terms
are both positive as country 2 can raise more additional revenue by increasing its tax
rate. The third term gives the loss in tax base that country 2 experiences when losing
the marginal firm. This effect is ambiguous because there are offsetting effects on the
profitability of the pivotal firm in country 2 (as given in the squared bracket of this
term): market size has risen in country 2, but the marginal firm in this country also
faces higher costs as before. Finally, the fourth effect is negative, because the increase
18A prime empirical example in the OECD is Ireland, whose GDP growth rate since the 1980s has
far outpaced the OECD average. See OECD (2009).
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in the size of market 2 will make the pivotal firm respond more sensitively to a tax
increase in country 2. Consequently, we cannot sign (16) in general.
We can, however, sign the overall effect in (16), if we assume that the density of firms
is sufficiently low, relative to the cost spread (that is, φ is sufficiently small). Assume,
for example, that φ ' 1. In this case, ∂2cˆ/∂t2∂A2 = 0 and ∂cˆ/∂A2 = 1/2, leading to
∂2T2
∂t2∂A2
=
1
2
[
A2 − (cˆ− c)− t2 ∂cˆ
∂t2
]
> 0.
Intuitively in this case the profitability of the marginal firm falls from the perspective
of country 2, and this firm does not respond more elastically to an increase in t2.
Hence the impact response of t2 to the parameter change is unambiguously positive.
We summarize these results in:
Proposition 3 An isolated market expansion in country 2 reduces the tax rate of coun-
try 1 upon impact (for an unchanged level of t2). If the density of firms is sufficiently
small (φ is low) then an increase in A2 raises the tax rate of country 2 upon impact.
Note that Proposition 3 only makes a statement about the impact effect of the change
in A2 on optimal tax rates. To this must be added the indirect effects that result from
the best response of each country to the initial change in the other country’s tax rate.
These indirect effects tend to reduce t2, whereas their effect on t1 is ambiguous. In
general, the total effects on changes in both countries’ tax rates can therefore not be
signed without imposing further restrictions on the model. Nevertheless, in many cases
it can be expected that the total effects of the change are of the same sign as the impact
effects given in Proposition 3. In these cases our model thus predicts a convergence of
tax rates when the size of the two markets becomes more similar. In particular, one
implication of our model is that the growing size of small, peripheral markets may
impose downward pressure on the tax rates in larger countries, even if tax rates in the
small countries simultaneously rise.
4.2 Market expansion in both countries
Our above analysis has already shown that a growing size of one market may cause the
government of the competing country to reduce its tax rate. In the following we consider
a simultaneous expansion of both markets, as given by dξ = dA1 + dA2 ≡ dA. This
specification aims to capture the fact that common technological and economic factors,
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such as the IT ‘revolution’ or global economic integration, have expanded the markets
of different potential host countries simultaneously. This is most clearly expressed in the
interpretation of our model as one with export platform investment (see Section 2.1),
where a positive shock occurs to the overall size of the common, integrated market in
which the investment is made.
Our analysis starts from an initial situation where A1 = A2+N ensuring, from Proposi-
tion 2, that an interior tax equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We perturb the initial
equilibrium and show that the exogenous market expansion will reduce tax rates in
both countries, despite the resulting higher profitability of firms. Our results for this
case refer to the total effects on tax policy, including the strategic responses of each
country to the tax policy change induced in the neighboring jurisdiction.
We first show that the impact effect of the common market expansion dA on the tax
rate of the larger country 1 is unambiguously negative (see the appendix):
∂2T1
∂t1∂A
= (c− cˆ)
[
1 +
2φ− 1
2
∂cˆ
∂A
]
− ∂cˆ
∂A
[
A1 − φ(c− cˆ)− (c+ cˆ)
2
]
− t1 ∂cˆ
∂t1
[
1 + (2φ− 1) ∂cˆ
∂A
]
− t1 ∂
2cˆ
∂t1∂A
[A1 − 2φ(c− cˆ)− cˆ] < 0, (17)
where ∂2cˆ/(∂t1∂A) > 0 follows from (7a) and
∂cˆ
∂A
=
(t1 − t2)
Θ
> 0. (18)
These effects are similar in structure to those in equation (16). The first two terms
in (17) describe the change in the profit tax base of country 1. The first effect is
positive from the common increase in market size, but the second effect is negative as
the simultaneous increase in A1 and A2 raises cˆ at unchanged tax rates [see (18)]. The
third effect is negative because the higher profits of the marginal firm imply a larger
loss in country 1’s tax base when this firm relocates. Finally, the fourth effect is also
negative, indicating that the marginal firm will react more sensitively to an increase
in t1 after its profitability has risen. It is shown in the appendix that the positive first
effect is dominated by the other three. Hence the impact effect of a simultaneous and
equal increase in A1 and A2 on country 1’s tax rate is unambiguously negative.
Proceeding analogously for country 2, it turns out that the impact effect on this coun-
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try’s tax rate is exactly zero (see the appendix):
∂2T2
∂t2∂A
= (cˆ− c)
[
1− 2φ+ 1
2
∂cˆ
∂A
]
+
∂cˆ
∂A
[
A2 − φ(cˆ− c)− (cˆ+ c)
2
]
+ t2
∂cˆ
∂t2
[
1− (2φ+ 1) ∂cˆ
∂A
]
+ t2
∂2cˆ
∂t2∂A
[A2 − 2φ(cˆ− c)− cˆ] = 0, (19)
where ∂cˆ/∂A > 0 is given in (18) and ∂2cˆ/(∂t2∂A) < 0 follows from (7a).
The first two effects are now both positive, because the increase in cˆ also works to
increase the tax base of country 2. The third effect is ambiguous for country 2, because
there are counteracting effects on the profitability of its marginal firm. Finally, the
fourth term in (19) is negative. In sum, these effects just offset each other and the
induced impact effect on t2 is zero. The intuition for this result is that the initial
condition A1 = A2+N is maintained by the simultaneous and equal increase in market
size. In this case we know from our discussion of Proposition 2 that the taxing power
of country 2 depends only on the tax rate set by country 1.
The critical difference between (17) and (19) is that a simultaneous expansion of both
markets increases the profitability of firms and thus raises the importance of the initial
difference in profit tax rates. Hence, if tax rates were (hypothetically) held fixed at their
initial levels, some of the moderate-cost firms that initially located in country 1 would
find it in their interest to relocate to country 2, once the positive shock has occurred
in both countries. It is this relocation of firms as a result of higher gross profits which
forces country 1, but not country 2, to lower its tax rate upon impact.
We have now determined all the terms that are needed to evaluate the total effect of
the simultaneous increase in A1 and A2 on the optimal tax rates. Substituting (13a),
(13b), (17) and (19) in (12) yields
dt1
dA
=
1
|J |
(
−∂
2Tj
∂t2j
∂2Ti
∂ti∂A
)
< 0,
dt2
dA
=
1
|J |
(
∂2T2
∂t1∂t2
∂2T1
∂t1∂A
)
< 0. (20)
Hence we get:
Proposition 4 Starting from an initial equilibrium where country 1 is substantially
larger than country 2 (A1 = A2 + N), a simultaneous and equal expansion of both
markets, dA1 = dA2 > 0, reduces equilibrium tax rates in both countries.
Proposition 4 is illustrated with the help of Figure 1, where panels (a) and (b) corre-
spond to the cases where country 1’s best response function is downward or upward
20
Figure 1: Market expansion in both countries
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sloping, respectively.19 Upon impact, the expansion of both countries’ markets shifts
the best response function of country 1 to the left, but it does not cause a shift in the
best response function of country 2. In the new equilibrium, country 1’s tax rate is
thus unambiguously reduced, no matter whether this country’s best response is down-
ward or upward sloping. The fall in t1 will in turn lead to a downward adjustment of
country 2’s tax rate, as the equilibrium moves along this country’s upward sloping best
reply.
Finally we determine the effects of the simultaneous change in market size on (expected)
tax revenues in both countries. From the envelope theorem these are given by
dTi
dA
=
∂Ti
∂A︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+
∂Ti
∂tj
dtj
dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
∀ i, j. (21)
We distinguish again between the direct (impact) effect for given tax rates, and the
indirect effect due to an adjusted tax rate of the neighboring country. From eq. (8)
the direct effects in (21) are simply the first two terms in (17) and (19), respectively,
multiplied by the corresponding tax rate. This yields an ambiguous impact effect of
the common increase in market size on tax revenues in country 1. While the profit
tax base of the firms remaining in country 1 is increased, some firms will relocate to
country 2 as they react more sensitively to the pre-existing tax differential. Hence the
19The figure is confined to the tax ranges where best responses are continuous in both countries.
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net effect on the profit tax base in country 1 is uncertain. In contrast, the profit tax
base of country 2 rises from both the higher profitability of the firms that are located
in country 2 initially, and from the relocation of firms to this country following the
external shock. Hence the direct effect of the simultaneous and equal increases in A1
and A2 on country 2’s tax revenues is unambiguously positive. We sum up these results
in our final proposition:
Proposition 5 Starting from an initial equilibrium with A1 = A2+N , a simultaneous
and equal increase in market size dA1 = dA2 > 0 unambiguously raises the tax base in
country 2 upon impact, whereas the effect on country 1’s tax base is ambiguous.
The indirect effects in (21) are negative for both countries, however. It is straightforward
to establish that ∂Ti/∂tj > 0 ∀ i, that is, each country benefits from a tax increase in
the other country. Since the expansion of markets lowers tax rates in both countries
by Proposition 4, each country will accordingly lose from the induced tax reduction
in the neighboring jurisdiction. Therefore, even though both markets expand and the
aggregate profit tax base in the two countries taken together will unambiguously rise,
the effect on tax revenues is ambiguous in both countries.
Clearly, the results from our simple model cannot be more than suggestive when they
are compared with the actual developments in corporate tax policy among the OECD
countries (see Table 1). Nevertheless, there are some notable consistencies. Firstly, we
have shown that an overall increase in the profitability of firms can be accompanied
by falling tax rates, as the rise in firms’ profits triggers more severe tax competition
(Proposition 4). Moreover, and contrary to what is often argued, our model implies
that more aggressive tax competition following the expansion of markets is initiated by
the large, high-tax country, whereas the small country merely responds to this tax cut
by adjusting its own tax downward. Against this background it is interesting to recall
that the first major corporate tax reforms were initiated by the United Kingdom and
the United States in the mid-1980s, following a period of deregulation and GDP growth
in both of these economies.20 Only then did smaller countries in Europe and elsewhere
start to enact similar reforms. Finally, we have shown that an overall increase in firm
profitability raises the tax base of the small country upon impact, whereas the effect
on the large country’s tax base is ambiguous (Proposition 5). These differences are
20The United Kingdom lowered its statutory corporate tax rate in several stages from 52% in 1982
to 35% in 1986. The United States reduced its corporate tax rate from 50% to 39% in 1987.
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consistent with the empirical finding that corporate tax revenue in the small, low-tax
OECD countries has unambiguously risen, whereas the effect on tax revenue in the
large, high-tax countries has been mixed.
With respect to the existing literature, the distinguishing feature of the present analysis
has been the focus on expanding markets as the underlying shock to tax policies, in
conjunction with firm heterogeneity. The previous literature on the subject has mostly
relied on exogenous reductions in (broadly defined) ‘mobility costs’ of firms, in order to
motivate stiffer tax competition and falling levels of capital taxation (see, e.g., Kind et
al., 2005). In the present model we have shown that declining tax rates can alternatively,
and perhaps surprisingly, be explained by a general increase in market potential. In
particular, this argument also applies to an increase in the size of a common market,
which raises the profitability of an export platform investment made by multinational
firms.21 We show that, as a result of its rising profitability, the pivotal firm becomes
more sensitive to profit taxes and optimal tax rates in all countries may fall. Thus tax
competition for heterogeneous multinationals does not ease when the target region as
a whole becomes more attractive.
5 Extension: The model with variable outputs
In this section we briefly consider an extended version of our model where each firm,
when deciding to locate in a particular country, simultaneously decides to set up a plant
of a certain capacity. Hence the location and output choices are made simultaneously,
before each firm learns the cost structure of its competitors.22
Let qi(c) denote the output of a firm of type c locating in country i. This output is
determined from maximizing expected after-tax profits pii = (1 − ti)qi(pi − c). The
first-order condition for a firm in country i is pi(qi + Qˆ−i) + qip′(qi + Qˆ−i) − c = 0,
where Qˆ−i denotes the aggregate expected output of all rival firms in country i and
p′ is the derivative of the demand function. With linear demand, the optimal output
choice of a firm with cost c in country i is
qi(c) = (Ai − Qˆ−i − c)/2 . (22)
21Firm heterogeneity is also observed among multinationals, which are found to be more productive,
on average, than firms which export or serve their local market only. See Helpman et al. (2004).
22Formally, this is a Bayesian Cournot game similar to Long et al. (2009), which is extended to the
simultaneous location choice of firms.
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Using (22) leads to optimized after-tax profits equal to pii = (1− ti)[qi(c)]2 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}.
If an interior equilibrium exists with firms locating in both countries, then there must
be a firm with a critical cost level cˆ that is indifferent between the two locations:
(1− t1)[q1(cˆ)]2 = (1− t2)[q2(cˆ)]2 ⇐⇒ q1(cˆ) =
√
(1− t2)
(1− t1) q2(cˆ). (23)
It follows from (23) that the pivotal firm produces a higher level of output in the
high-tax country. In Regime I, where country 1 chooses the higher tax rate, the pivotal
firm’s output will thus be higher in country 1.
Where do firms with costs slightly above cˆ locate? To answer this question, we consider
the effects of a small increase in costs on after-tax profits in each of the two countries,
starting from the critical cost level cˆ. Using (22) and (23) yields
dpi1(cˆ)
dc
= −(1− t1)q1(cˆ) = −(1− t2)
√
(1− t1)
(1− t2) q2(cˆ),
dpi2(cˆ)
dc
= −(1− t2)q2(cˆ). (24)
Equation (24) shows that the negative effects on after-tax profits of an increase in
production costs are smaller in absolute value in the high-tax country 1. As maximized
profits are monotonic in c this implies that all firms with c > cˆ will have higher after-
tax profits in country 1, whereas all firms with c < cˆ have higher after-tax profits in
country 2. Hence, as in our benchmark model [cf. eq. (2)], high-cost firms will locate
in the high-tax country in the location equilibrium.
It is then straightforward to derive the rival firms’ aggregate output in each country,
Qˆ−1 and Qˆ−2, and the expressions for expected tax revenue in each country. This is
done in the Appendix. The extended model is too complex, however, to be solved
analytically. We therefore carried out simulation analyses, whose primary aim is to
establish conditions under which a Nash equilibrium in taxes exists in the extended
model.
Following our argument in Section 3 above, a non-cooperative tax equilibrium should
exist, if the difference in the market size parameters Ai is sufficiently large. More
precisely, a sufficient condition for existence should be that, if tax rates were (hypo-
thetically) set at the same level in both countries, all production would take place in
the larger market. In contrast to our benchmark model this condition cannot solely be
expressed in terms of exogenous variables, because aggregate production is now endoge-
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Table 2: Nash equilibria in the extended model with variable output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A1 t1 t2 T1 T2 cˆ Q1 Q2 qˆ1 qˆ2
CASE 1: A2 = 60, N = 3, c = 13, c = 10
70 – – – – – – – – –
75 0.835 0.759 190.63 97.33 11.29 22.77 14.88 13.31 11.53
80 0.845 0.746 226.36 94.49 11.25 24.98 14.55 14.27 11.64
90 0.861 0.722 307.25 89.18 11.18 29.45 13.92 16.18 11.80
CASE 2: A2 = 30, N = 2, c = 2, c = 0
33 – – – – – – – – –
35 0.614 0.524 60.13 33.02 0.85 7.52 5.17 6.54 6.08
40 0.649 0.478 88.14 27.74 0.74 9.24 4.64 7.33 6.27
45 0.678 0.435 121.85 23.11 0.65 11.00 4.16 8.15 6.40
Notes : Qi: total production in country i; qˆi: production per firm in country i (= Qi/ni)
nous. Nevertheless, our simulations show that the basic argument made in Section 3
carries over to the extended model. The simulation results are presented in Table 2.
The two cases shown in Table 2 yield qualitatively similar results; hence it is sufficient
to discuss Case 1 in more detail. Here we fix the value of A2 = 60 and consider
different values of A1. For A1 = 70 the size differential between the two markets is
too small to permit the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For values of
A1 ≥ 75, however, a Nash equilibrium exists with country 1 as the high-tax country.23
Corresponding to our benchmark model, column (6) shows that the expected number of
firms in country 1 exceeds that in country 2. Moreover, aggregate output is also higher
in country 1 [columns (7)–(8)]. Finally, columns (9) and (10) show that the average
output per firm is higher in country 1, even though this country hosts the high-cost
firms. This is due to the discontinuous jump in output at the cost level cˆ [cf. eq. (23)].
These results show that the basic properties of our benchmark model carry over to an
extended setting with variable outputs of firms.
23To determine the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we compute tax rates and tax
revenues in a constrained equilibrium where country 1 is exogenously taken to be the high-tax country.
We then test whether country 1 can increase its tax revenue by marginally undercutting the tax rate
that country 2 chooses in this constrained equilibrium. A (unconstrained) Nash equilibrium in taxes
exists iff country 1 can not increase its revenues by switching to Regime II.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have employed a simple model of tax competition for heterogeneous,
internationally mobile firms. This model leads to clear predictions regarding the inter-
action between market conditions, the cost structure of firms locating in a particular
country, and tax policies. A first result is that firms sort according to their productiv-
ity, with low-cost firms settling in the low-tax country. This result is consistent with
the empirical observation that the average gross profitability of investments is higher
in low-tax countries. It thus offers a rivaling explanation for this stylized fact, which
has so far been exclusively ascribed to income shifting by multinational firms. This is
a potentially important finding from a policy perspective because the perceived em-
pirical importance of income shifting has been a major motivation for several recent
corporate tax reforms (such as the German tax reform of 2008). To the extent that
low corporate tax bases in high-tax countries are indeed caused by low-profitability
investments, rather than by profit shifting, the focus of these reforms may have been
partly misplaced.
A second result of our analysis is that a common increase in the market potential of
host countries can lead to intensified tax competition and reduced tax rates in both
countries while corporate tax bases are simultaneously increased. The reason is that
the pivotal firm in each country will experience higher profits, causing it to react
more sensitively to changes in tax rates. This finding offers one possible explanation
for the puzzling fact that falling tax rates and increasing corporate tax receipts have
occurred simultaneously in many OECD countries. At the same time, our results are
also consistent with the observation that the growth in corporate tax revenue seems
to have been more robust among small, low-tax countries than among their larger,
high-tax neighbors.
In order to bring these results forward, an important assumption in the present paper
has been that the output of each firm is fixed. It is known from the recent interna-
tional trade literature that when firm size is endogenized, then expanding the size of a
common market will benefit the productive firms more than proportionately, shifting
market shares from high-cost to low-cost firms. As our extended model has shown,
the small country still levies the lower profit tax rate in this case, and it attracts the
low-cost firms. However, tax competition may become more severe when firm size is
endogenous because gross profits - and hence corporate tax revenue - increase more
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than proportionately with a decrease in production costs. A further extension of our
analysis would be to give governments a second instrument in the competition for the
most profitable firms, by letting them choose to which extent production costs are tax-
deductible. This would allow to study the tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening reforms,
which have occurred in many countries, in a setting with firm heterogeneity. We leave
these extensions to future research.
Appendix
Optimal tax rates in Regime II
In Regime II, tax revenues in the two countries are given by
T II1 = t1
∫ cˆ
c
[A1 − φ(cˆ− c)− c]φdc, T II2 = t2
∫ c
cˆ
[A2 − φ(c− cˆ)− c]φdc, (A.1)
where the relevant expression for cˆ is now given in (4b). Differentiating with respect
to ti yields the regime-specific first-order conditions
∂T II1
∂t1
= (cˆII − c)
[
A1 − φ(cˆII − c)− (cˆII + c)
2
]
+ t1
∂cˆII
∂t1
[A1 − 2φ(cˆII − c)− cˆII ] = 0,
∂T II2
∂t2
= (c− cˆII)
[
A2 − φ(c− cˆII)− (c+ cˆII)
2
]
− t2∂cˆII
∂t2
[A2 − 2φ(c− cˆII)− cˆII ] = 0.
(A.2)
Proof of Proposition 1
Rewriting the two expressions in (A.2) yields
tII1 = (cˆII − c)
(−∂cˆII
∂t1
)−1
[A1 − φ(cˆII − c)− 0.5(cˆII + c)]
[A1 − 2φ(cˆII − c)− cˆII ] , (A.3)
tII2 = (c− cˆII)
(
∂cˆII
∂t2
)−1
[A2 − φ(c− cˆII)− 0.5(c+ cˆII)]
[A2 − 2φ(c− cˆII)− cˆII ] . (A.4)
A Regime II equilibrium is defined by t1 < t2. Hence for such an equilibrium to exist,
at least one of the three positive terms in (A.3) must be smaller than the corresponding
term in (A.4). In the following we compare the three terms in turn, always starting
from the assumption that t1 < t2.
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(i) (cˆII − c) < (c− cˆII) =⇒ 2cˆII − c− c < 0
Using (4b) and performing straightforward manipulations we obtain
2cˆII − c− c = 1
ΘII
{2(A1 − A2)(1− t2) + (t2 − t1)[2A1 −N − (c+ c)]} > 0. (A.5)
This is unambiguously positive in Regime II because (i) A1 > A2 by our convention
that country 1 is the larger one, (ii) t2 > t1 by the definition of Regime II, and (iii)
the term in the squared bracket must be positive from the condition for an interior tax
optimum (10). Hence the first condition for tII1 < t
II
2 is not fulfilled.
(ii) (−∂cˆII/∂t1)−1 < (∂cˆII/∂t2)−1 =⇒ (−∂cˆII/∂t1) > (∂cˆII/∂t2)
It is immediately seen from (7b) that this condition is also not fulfilled in Regime II,
where t1 < t2.
(iii) ΓI ≡ [A1 − φ(cˆII − c)− 0.5(cˆII + c)][A2 − 2φ(c− cˆII)− cˆII ]
−[A1 − 2φ(cˆII − c)− cˆII ][A2 − φ(c− cˆII)− 0.5(c+ cˆII)] < 0
Multiplying out the terms on the RHS, rearranging terms and performing several
straightforward manipulations yields, in a first step
ΓI = 0.5(A1 − A2)(c− cˆII) + A2φ(2cˆII − c− c)− (A1 − A2)φ(c− cˆII),
+ 0.5(A2 − cˆII)(c− c) + cˆIIφ(2cˆII − c− c)− 2φ(cˆ2II − cc).
Combining the last two terms and expanding this can be rewritten as
ΓI = 0.5(A1 − A2 + 2n)(c− cˆII) + 0.5(A2 − 2N − cˆII)(c− c) + ∆, (A.6)
where the first two terms are positive from A1 > A2 and (10) and
∆ = (A1 − A2)φ(c− cˆII) + (A2 − c)φ(2cˆII − c− c).
To sign ∆ we substitute (A.5), rearrange terms, expand with 2(A2−c)(A1−A2)(t2−t2)
and use the fact that (c− cˆII)/(c− c) < 1/2 from (A.5). This yields
∆ >
φ
ΘII
{(t2 − t1) [(A1 − A2)(A2 − c+ (cˆII − c)) + 2(A2 − c) (A2 − 0.5N − 0.5(c+ c))]
+ (A1 − A2) [(A2 − 0.5N − c) (2− t1 − t2)]} > 0,
which is unambiguously positive from A1 > A2, eq. (10) and t2 − t1 > 0 in Regime II.
Hence we unambiguously obtain ΓI > 0 so that the third condition for t
II
1 < t
II
2 is also
violated. Thus there cannot be an interior Nash equilibrium in Regime II where the
tax rates are given by (A.3) and (A.4) and t1 < t2 holds. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in three steps: (i) we show that reaction functions exist in the
relevant range; (ii) we identify two tax functions, one which makes country 1 attract
all firms and one which makes country 2 attract all firms, and show when an interior
solution exists; (iii) we demonstrate that the reaction functions will intersect exactly
once in the case of an interior equilibrium.
(i) Reaction functions exist if there is one and only one optimal ti as a response to each
tj. This is true if the second-order conditions for an interior maximum are fulfilled.
From (9a) and (9b) the second-order conditions of the two countries’ optimal tax
problems are given by
∂2T I1
∂t21
=
(
−2∂cˆI
∂t1
− t1∂
2cˆI
∂t21
)
[A1 − 2φ(c− cˆI)− cˆI ]− t1
(
∂cˆI
∂t1
)2
(2φ− 1) < 0, (A.7)
∂2T I2
∂t22
=
(
2
∂cˆI
∂t2
+ t2
∂2cˆI
∂t22
)
[A2 − 2φ(cˆI − c)− cˆI ]− t2
(
∂cˆI
∂t2
)2
(2φ+ 1) < 0. (A.8)
In (A.7) and (A.8) both terms are then unambiguously negative from (7a) and (6) as
∂cˆI/∂t
2
1 > 0 and ∂cˆI/∂t
2
2 < 0. Hence both countries’ tax revenue functions are strictly
concave in Regime I and reaction functions are well-defined.
(ii) Next, we identify two tax schemes for country 1, as functions of the tax rate of
country 2. First, consider (4a) and determine country 1’s largest possible tax rate which
still induces all firms to locate in country 1, i.e., cˆI = c. We denote this tax rate by τ :
τ(t2) ≡ A1 − A2 −N + t2(A2 − c)
A1 −N − c , τ(0) =
A1 − A2 −N
A1 −N − c ≥ 0, τ(1) = 1. (A.9)
Expression (A.9) shows that τ is linearly increasing with t2. If A1 = A2 + N , then
τ(0) = 0. Second, consider (4a) again and determine country 1’s smallest tax rate
which makes all firms locate in country 2, i.e., cˆI = c. This tax is denoted by σ:
σ(t2) ≡ A1 − A2 +N + t2(A2 −N − c)
A1 − c , σ(0) =
A1 − A2 +N
A1 − c > 0, σ(1) = 1.
(A.10)
Expression (A.10) shows that σ also increases linearly with t2. Of course, σ(t2) > τ(t2)
for all t2 ∈ [0, 1[. Both tax schemes are shown in Figure 2.
Any equilibrium must be found strictly in between the τ– and the σ–lines in Figure 2:
there is no equilibrium on the σ–line because country 1 would attract no firm but could
do so with a positive tax rate. Furthermore, there is no equilibrium on the τ–line for
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Figure 2: τ(t2) and σ(t2)
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t2 > 0 because country 2 has no tax base but could generate tax revenues by reducing
t2. The only equilibrium candidate on the τ–line is τ(0). At this point, given by point B
in Figure 2, country 2 cannot do better by lowering its tax rate, as this would imply
negative tax revenue if it attracted any firms. Whether τ(0) is an equilibrium depends
on the marginal tax revenues of country 1 at τ(0):
∂T1
∂t1
(τ(0), 0) = (c− c)
(
A1 −N − c+ c
2
)
(A.11)
− (A1 −N − c)(A1 − 2N − c)(A1 − A2 −N)
(1 + φ)(A1 − A2 −N) + 2φ(A2 − c) .
If (A.11) is negative, then t1 = τ(0), t2 = 0 is the unique equilibrium, featuring full
agglomeration of firms in country 1. If (A.11) is positive, country 1’s best response to
t2 = 0 is a tax rate t1 > τ(0). This is indicated in Figure 2 by a point such as A.
1
(iii) We now turn to existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium if (A.11) is positive.
We have already determined two points on the reaction curves: if (A.11) is positive,
country 1’s reaction curve starts at A while t2 = 0 is still country 2’s best response to
t1 = τ(0); see point B. We evaluate country 1’s marginal tax revenues (9a) along the
τ–line and country 2’s marginal tax revenues (9b) along the σ–line. The derivatives are
1It is easily shown that ∂T1/∂t1(τ(0), 0) increases with A2. Thus an interior candidate equilibrium
(as opposed to an equilibrium with full agglomeration) is likely, if country 2 is not too small.
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denoted by the superscripts τ and σ and are given by
∂T τ1
∂t1
= (c− c)
(
A1 −N − c+ c
2
)
(A.12)
− τ(t2)(1− t2)((A1 −N − φc)(φ+ 1) + (A2 + φc)(A1 − A2 −N))
(φ+ 1)(1− t2) + (φ− 1)(1− τ(t2)) ,
∂T σ2
∂t2
= (c− c)
(
A2 −N − c+ c
2
)
(A.13)
+ t2
(1− σ(t2))((A1 −N − φc)(φ+ 1) + (A2 + φc)(A1 − A2 −N))
(φ+ 1)(1− t2) + (φ− 1)(1− σ(t2)) .
Note that ∂T1/∂t1(τ(0), 0) = ∂T
τ
1 /∂t1(t2 = 0). Thus, if (A.11) is positive, we find that
∂T τ1
∂t1
(t2 = 0) > 0,
∂T σ2
∂t2
(t2 = 0) > 0, (A.14)
lim
t2→1
∂T τ1
∂t1
= −∞, lim
t2→1
∂T σ2
∂t2
= −∞.
Since tax revenues are a continuous and twice differentiable function of tax rates, (A.14)
proves that at least one tax rate t2, with 0 < t2 < 1, must exist such that ∂T
τ
1 /∂t1 = 0;
this is shown by a point such as C in Figure 2. Similarly, at least one tax rate t1 with
0 < t1 < 1 must exist such that ∂T
σ
2 /∂t2 = 0; see point D in Figure 2. Point C is thus
also on the reaction curve of country 1 and D is on the reaction curve of country 2.
Since reaction functions are continuous, they must run from A to C for country 1 and
from B to D for country 2. Consequently, they must intersect at least once. Due to
|J | > 0, they can intersect only once because any second intersection would imply
|J | < 0 from the continuity of best responses. This proves existence and uniqueness for
the interior candidate equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
To sign (17), it suffices to compare the first and the third term on the RHS of the
equation. The squared bracket in the first term is unambiguously smaller than the
corresponding bracket in the third term. Hence a sufficient condition for (17) to be
negative is that (c − cˆ) < t1(∂cˆ/∂t1). But this last inequality is implied by the first-
order condition for country 1’s initial tax rate (9a). In (9a), the squared bracket in the
first term is unambiguously larger than the squared bracket in the second term when
φ > 1 [cf. (6)]. Hence (c− cˆ) < t1(∂cˆ/∂t1) must hold for the two terms to sum to zero.
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To sign (19), we simplify the value for cˆI in (4a) when A1 = A2+N holds in the initial
equilibrium. This yields
cˆI |A1=A2+N =
A2(t1 − t2) + c φ (2− t1 − t2)
t1 − t2 + φ(2− t1 − t2) (A.15)
This also yields simplified derivative properties
∂cˆ
∂t1
=
2(1− t2)φ(A2 − c)
Θ2I
,
∂cˆ
∂t2
=
−2(1− t1)φ(A2 − c)
Θ2I
,
∂2cˆ
∂t2∂A
=
−2(1− t1)φ
Θ2I
.
(A.16)
We decompose ∂2T2/(∂t2∂A) = ψ1+ψ2, where ψ1 is the sum of the first and the third
term in (19), whereas ψ2 stands for the second and the fourth term. Using (A.15)–
(A.16) and performing straightforward manipulations gives
Ψ1 =
[
(cˆ− c) + t2 ∂cˆ
∂t2
] [
t1 − t2
2
+ 2φ(1− t1)
]
1
ΘI
− t2
(
φ+
1
2
)
∂cˆ
∂t2
∂cˆ
∂A
(A.17)
From (9b) we obtain through simple manipulations[
t2
∂cˆ
∂t2
+ (cˆ− c)
] [
A2 − φ(cˆ− c)− (cˆ+ c)
2
]
= t2
∂cˆ
∂t2
(
φ+
1
2
)
(cˆ− c)
Substituting this in (A.17) and using (A.15)–(A.16) and (18) gives
ψ1 = t2
∂cˆ
∂t2
(
φ+
1
2
)
(t1 − t2) 1
ΘI
[
(A2 − c)(t1 − t2)/2 + 2φ(1− t1)
{A2 − φ(cˆ− c)− (cˆ+ c)/2}ΘI − 1
]
.
Again using (A.15)–(A.16) and (5a) shows that the term in squared brackets is zero
and hence ψ1 = 0.
Next we sum over the second and the fourth term in (19). This gives
ψ2 =
1
Θ2I
{
(t1 − t2)ΘI
[
A2 − φ(cˆ− c)− (cˆ+ c)
2
]
− 2φ(1− t2)t2[A2 − 2φ(cˆ− c)− cˆ]
}
.
Substituting t2 from (9b) into the second term and using (A.15)–(A.16) shows that
ψ2 = 0. Hence ∂
2T2/(∂t2∂A) = 0. Using these results in (20) yields Proposition 4. ¤
Appendix to Section 5
When all high-cost firms locate in country 1, a firm that wants to locate in this country
expects an aggregate output of all rival firms equal to
Qˆ−1 = (N − 1)
∫ c
cˆ
(A1 − Qˆ−1 − c)
2
dc
c− c =
(N − 1)[2(A1 − Qˆ−1)− cˆ− c](c− cˆ)
c− c .
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Solving this for Qˆ−1 gives
Qˆ−1 =
(N − 1)(2A1 − cˆ− c)(c− cˆ)
2[(N + 1)c− (N − 1)cˆ− 2c] . (A.18)
Similarly, for a firm contemplating to locate in country 2 the expected output of all
rival firms in this country is
Qˆ−2 = (N − 1)
∫ cˆ
c
(A2 − Qˆ−2 − c)
2
dc
c− c ⇒ Qˆ−2 =
(N − 1)(2A2 − cˆ− c)(cˆ− c)
2[(N − 1)cˆ− (N + 1)c+ 2c] .
(A.19)
The expected tax revenues in the two countries are given by
T1 = t1
∫ c
cˆ
[q1(c)]
2 dc
c− c = t1
(A1 − cˆ− Qˆ1)3 − (A1 − c− Qˆ1)3
12(c− c) ,
T2 = t2
∫ cˆ
c
[q2(c)]
2 dc
c− c = t2
(A2 − c− Qˆ2)3 − (A2 − cˆ− Qˆ2)3
12(c− c) , (A.20)
where Qˆ−1 and Qˆ−2 are given in (A.18) and (A.19), respectively.
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